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IN DEFENSE OF “FOOTNOTE FOUR”: 
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW 
DEAL’S EFFECT ON LAND REGULATION 
IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
CHRISTOPHER S. DODRILL* 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Supreme Court established 
and reinforced numerous so-called “economic rights.” Lochner v. New York—
this period’s paradigm case—held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause contained an implicit right to contract.1 During the Lochner era, 
the Court invalidated almost 200 federal and state economic and labor 
regulations for interfering with the right to contract and for violating 
substantive due process.2 In 1937, however, Justice Stone’s famous “footnote 
four” in United States v. Carolene Products Co.3 closed the coffin on Lochner. 
After Carolene Products, the Court stopped applying heightened scrutiny to 
economic legislation, and it began consciously protecting “discrete and insular 
minorities.”4 Though most would accept that footnote four greatly affected the 
Court’s review of social legislation, some also see Carolene Products as ending 
an era of heightened protection for real-property rights.5 This view is mistaken. 
Though Carolene Products marked a dramatic shift in the Court’s approach 
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 1. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 2. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 466 (13th ed. 1997); 
see, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926) (declaring consumer-protection legislation 
unconstitutional); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding minimum-wage law 
unconstitutional); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down federal child-labor 
regulation); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (declaring law protecting unionizing 
unconstitutional). 
 3. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 4. Id. at 152 n.4. 
 5. See, e.g., STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 79 (1996) (“Since Carolene Products, the 
Court has been vigilant in cases involving civil rights, but deferential towards economic legislation.”); 
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 133 (2d ed. 1998) (“[T]he Carolene Products analysis instituted a double standard 
of constitutional review . . . .”); Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of 
American Politics, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 821–22 (1993) (labeling the post-New Deal Court’s review 
of property rights a “judicial abdication”); see also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social 
Vision and the Supreme Court’s Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence 
in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 427, 446 (1988) (stating that the 
Court’s heightened scrutiny of local zoning regulations ended with the demise of Lochnerian 
jurisprudence). 
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to social and labor legislation, it did not affect the Court’s already deferential 
review of land regulation. And why would it? The Lochner Court did not 
review land regulations with the same heightened scrutiny as it did economic 
legislation. The Lochner Court deferred to local exercises of the police power to 
regulate health, safety, and morality. It rejected most landowner challenges to 
land regulations and applied a consistent standard of review that favored 
government regulators, striking down only those land regulations it deemed 
“clearly arbitrary.” There was no need for the post-Carolene Products Court to 
lower the scrutiny of land regulation because, unlike its approach toward social 
legislation, the Lochner Court deferred to state and local governments in the 
area of land regulation. 
A comparison of Lochner-era land-regulation cases with post-Carolene 
Products land-regulation cases reveals that the New Deal did not doctrinally 
relax the Court’s review of land regulation. The Court continued to apply the 
Lochner-era test through the New Deal’s jurisprudential realignment. In fact, 
beginning in the late 1970s, the Court’s balancing test actually favored property-
owner plaintiffs and raised the bar for land regulators relative to the Lochner 
Court’s standard of review. This article’s purpose is neither to exhaustively 
catalog land-regulation cases, nor to judge the propriety of the Court’s 
decisions. Rather, its purpose is to correct the mistaken view that the New Deal 
and the accompanying shift in the Court’s social-welfare jurisprudence affected 
the Court’s approach to land-regulation cases. 
Part I of this article explains the Lochner-era Supreme Court’s standard of 
review through an analysis of land-regulation cases decided between 1909 and 
1937. Part II describes the approach taken by the Court after Carolene 
Products, between 1937 and 1980, and demonstrates that the Court’s approach 
did not become more government-friendly, but if anything, became more 
landowner-friendly. Part III concludes. 
I 
LAND REGULATION IN THE LOCHNER ERA 
Philip Nichols’ 1917 treatise on eminent domain demonstrates the broad 
scope of the Lochner-era police power. Of that era’s police power, Nichols 
wrote, “[I]t is not confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or 
unsanitary, but extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in a state as 
to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people.”6 Nichols explained that 
the police power was defined by a reasonableness standard, which focused 
solely on the government’s action—judicial scrutiny concentrated on the 
regulation’s purpose, requiring only that it serve the general welfare.7 
During the Lochner era, the Court did not analyze land-regulation cases as 
it does today. Then, the Court reviewed land regulations through the lens of the 
 
 6. PHILIP NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 272 (2d ed. 1917). 
 7. See id. at 279. 
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause.8 This due-process approach focused on whether 
the government’s action was a proper exercise of the police power, and it 
largely ignored the effect on the landowner. The Court applied a “clearly 
arbitrary” test: government action was valid unless clearly unreasonable and 
arbitrary.9 
Land-regulation cases in the Lochner-era demonstrate this standard. Welch 
v. Swasey is a classic prevention-of-harm case in which the Court upheld a 
Boston ordinance that limited the height of certain residential buildings to 
eighty feet.10 Boston derived its power to enact the regulation from a 1904 
Massachusetts statute that delegated to city mayors the power to appoint a 
commission to set maximum-building-height regulations within individual 
cities.11 In Boston, the mayor appointed such a commission, and the commission 
issued the regulations.12 The plaintiff contended that the city’s purpose was 
solely aesthetic and, therefore, illegitimate.13 The city claimed that the 
ordinance’s purpose was safety: fires in taller buildings are more difficult to put 
out than those in shorter buildings, and commercial buildings are usually built 
with more fireproof materials than residential buildings.14 Given the city’s 
declaration of a clear safety concern, the Court could have upheld the law on 
those grounds alone. 
Instead, after noting the safety rationale, the Court went on to broadly 
define the police power in general and apply a “clearly arbitrary” standard: only 
if “the means employed, pursuant to the statute, have no real, substantial 
relation to a public object which government can accomplish—if the statutes are 
arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond the necessities of the case”—will 
regulations be invalid.15 The Court left judging the wisdom and the necessity of 
the regulation to the legislature: “These are matters which it must be presumed 
were known by the legislature, and whether or not such were the facts was a 
question, among others, for the legislature to determine.”16 
The Court reaffirmed this deferential standard in Reinman v. City of Little 
Rock.17 Reinman concerned an ordinance prohibiting livery stables in certain 
 
 8. The Court changed its approach in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), discussed 
infra II, in which it began looking at land regulation through the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. 
 9. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1964) (explaining that 
the turn-of-the-century Court largely believed that the Takings question “never turns upon an 
examination of the economic consequences of the government’s action.”). 
 10. 214 U.S. 91, 103, 108 (1909). 
 11. Id. at 108. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 104. 
 14. Id. at 107–08. 
 15. Id. at 105. 
 16. Id. at 107. 
 17. 237 U.S. 171 (1915). 
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parts of the city.18 Despite the ordinance’s recitation that livery stables were 
“detrimental to the health, interest, and prosperity of the city,” the plaintiffs, 
livery stable operators, had operated their stable without specific complaints 
from nearby residents and with their own considerable investment, which the 
city had encouraged.19 The ordinance effectively closed the plaintiffs’ business, 
as no suitable alternative site was available.20 The plaintiffs challenged the city 
ordinance as a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.21 
Granting the city extensive room to regulate, the Court concluded that the 
ordinance regulated health and welfare; whether the stables were in fact a 
nuisance was “beside the question.”22 As in Welch, the Court applied the 
“clearly arbitrary” test.23 Justice Pitney, writing for the Court, explained, “[S]o 
long as the regulation in question is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and 
arbitrary, . . . it cannot be judicially declared that there is a deprivation of 
property without due process of law . . . .”24 Impact on investment-backed 
expectations and the loss of business were insufficient to overcome the 
regulation’s validity. The city had the power to broadly regulate for the 
“general welfare of the people.”25 
The Court again affirmed this generous standard in a clear “coming to the 
nuisance” case, Hadacheck v. Sebastian.26 The Court upheld a Los Angeles city 
ordinance that prohibited brick manufacturing.27 The plaintiff was a brickyard 
operator who built his business outside of the city.28 However, over a term of 
years the business fell within the city limits as Los Angeles grew around it.29 The 
regulation devastated Mr. Hadacheck, causing more than a ninety-percent 
reduction in value in his property: once worth $800,000 as a clay brickmaking 
source, the property value dropped to only $60,000 as a residential site.30 Other 
facts weighed in Hadacheck’s favor: he had investment-backed expectations in 
extensive infrastructure improvements, the city code failed to list brickmaking 
as a nuisance, and nothing suggested that his activity actually harmed the public 
health or safety.31 
Regardless, the Court upheld the ordinance as a valid exercise of the police 
power.32 Far from fanning Lochner’s flame, in a sweeping statement the Court 
 
 18. Id. at 172. 
 19. Id. at 172–73. 
 20. Id. at 173. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 176–77. 
 23. Id. at 177. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
 27. Id. at 404, 414. 
 28. Id. at 405. 
 29. Id. at 404. 
 30. Id. at 405. 
 31. Id. at 405–06. 
 32. Id. at 409–10. 
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said, “There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are in the 
way, they must yield to the good of the community.”33 The Court reiterated that 
it would uphold the police power so long as it was not exercised arbitrarily.34 
The Court explained, “It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on 
some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any 
limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily.”35 
Seven years later, the Court decided the case that some regard as the 
flagship of regulatory-takings cases,36 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.37 The 
facts of Mahon are well known. In 1878, the Pennsylvania Coal Company had 
sold the surface rights of land to individuals in Scranton.38 The deed specifically 
waived any right by the surface owner to the support of the underlying land.39 
Yet a rapidly growing population soon moved to the area, and people began 
building structures on the surface.40 The legislature passed several statutes, 
including the Kohler Act in 1921,41 prohibiting anthracite coal mining that 
caused subsidence of land used for “human habitation.”42 The U.S. Supreme 
Court held the Kohler Act was unconstitutional.43 
Mahon is where those who wave the property-owner’s bloody shirt seem to 
have gone wrong. The language of the opinion, along with cases surrounding 
Mahon, show that the case was not about the emergence of a new standard in 
land-regulation review,44 but about Pennsylvania’s interference with a 
bargained-for contract.45 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes said the Kohler 
Act “cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power . . . where the right 
to mine such coal has been reserved.”46 Holmes suggested that such an act would 
 
 33. Id. at 410. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978); see also William M. Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: 
Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86 GEO. L.J. 813, 822–26 (1998) (discussing this interpretation of 
Mahon). 
 37. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 38. Id. at 412. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Lawrence M. Friedman, A Search for Seizure: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in Context, 4 LAW 
& HIST. REV. 1, 2 (1986). 
 41. Id. at 3. Across the state, “pillar robbing” became a serious problem, for coal companies had 
similar waiver clauses upheld in court. Id. at 2. 
 42. In its brief, the coal company argued that several elements in the statute showed it was not 
meant as a safety regulation. It said the statute was underinclusive and applied only to coal mining—not 
to other mining that could have the same effects on land owners. It argued that the Act was meant to 
“merely augment the property rights of a favored few.” Mahon, 260 U.S. at 394–404. 
 43. Id. at 416. 
 44. Cf. Friedman, supra note 40, at 4 (explaining that the Court applied the same standard as 
previously applied in land-regulation cases and concluded merely that the legislature had crossed the 
line in Mahon). 
 45. In dissent, Brandeis argued that the Act was valid because the legislature enacted it to prevent 
harm. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 414 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Mahons’ brief argued that the state had a right 
to use the police power to “regulate contracts to land.” Id. at 406. 
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likely fail as an exercise of eminent domain; that the Mahons were attempting 
to avoid a bad bargain that even the legislature could not have avoided: 
If [the legislature had] been so short sighted as to acquire only surface rights without 
the right of support, we see no more authority for supplying the latter without 
compensation than there was for taking the right of way in the first place and refusing 
to pay for it because the public wanted it very much.47  
The heart of the issue was that the Pennsylvania legislature was trying to undo a 
bad deal—a deal that was embodied in a contract. It was the disruption of this 
contract that Holmes focused on, not the mere act of “taking.” He explained, 
“In general it is not plain that a man’s misfortunes or necessities will justify his 
shifting the damages to his neighbor’s shoulders.”48 
Those who label Mahon a “takings” case point specifically to what has 
become the most famous sentence of his five-page opinion: “The general rule at 
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”49 Yet one must view this “goes too 
far”50 language in context. “Too far” most likely refers to Pennsylvania’s 
interference with that contract, not only to the regulation’s impact on land use.51 
Reciprocity of advantage is evidence of reasonableness,52 presumably because a 
regulation that creates mutual benefit leaves the landowner whole (at least 
theoretically). And conversely, a drastic diminution in value is evidence of 
arbitrariness: it requires one person to shoulder an unfair burden.53 But these 
are both just indicators—it is doubtful that Holmes intended either factor to be 
determinative.54 Rather, Holmes probably believed that they were merely 
effects by which to weigh the legitimacy of the government action.55 It would 
have been inconsistent with the Court’s history of focusing on the regulation 
itself instead of its effect on the landowner to interpret lack of reciprocity of 
advantage and diminution of value as new rules created by the Mahon Court. 
Furthermore, cases decided immediately after Mahon do not show that the 
Court intended to change its approach to aggressive land regulations. 
 
 47. Id. at 415. Justice Kephart’s Pennsylvania Supreme Court dissent shows the problem was the 
State’s interference with an existing contract: “[T]his is merely part of a scheme to force the coal 
companies to support the surface of owners who have either for value released the right of support or 
have purchased their lots for a less price by reason of not acquiring this right with their purchase.” 
Mahon v. Pa. Coal Co., 118 A. 491, 500 (Pa. 1922) (Kephart, J., dissenting). 
 48. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. 
 49. Id. at 415. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Holmes closes his opinion saying, “So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to 
take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a 
danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought.” Id. at 416. 
 52. Id. at 415. 
 53. Id. at 413. 
 54. Holmes discusses reciprocity of advantage as an explanation for why the Court upheld a 
previous regulation, but he never says it is required. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; see also Treanor, supra 
note 36, at 857–58 (explaining how Holmes’s previous opinions show that he intended diminution of 
value to be part of a balancing test, rather than a complete test in itself). 
 55. See Treanor, supra note 36, at 857–58. 
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If the champions of Mahon are correct, and it was intended to introduce a 
new era in land-use jurisprudence, then the Court would have changed its 
approach to these cases. But it did not. To the contrary, two years after Mahon, 
beginning with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,56 the Court decided a 
string of zoning cases in which it continued applying the pre-Mahon standard of 
review. A comparison of the Court’s standard in pre-Mahon cases with post-
Mahon cases shows that the police power remained broad, and the Court 
remained deferential to legislative judgment as it continued applying the 
“clearly arbitrary” test. 
Euclid involved extensive zoning regulations in a Cleveland suburb.57 The 
Euclid zoning plan organized the village into six districts and subdivided each 
according to the use, height, and area of its buildings.58 The plaintiff was a 
residential landowner who challenged the regulation’s validity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.59 Like the pre-Mahon plaintiffs, he alleged that the 
regulation significantly affected his property value, lowering the value from 
$10,000 per acre to $2,500 per acre—a seventy-five percent reduction in value.60 
The Court, however, again sided with the city.61 
Defining its role as part of the state’s police power, Justice Sutherland wrote 
that nuisance law served as a useful, though not exclusive, guideline: “The law 
of nuisances . . . may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the 
helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of, the [police 
power].”62 Sutherland also explained that the legislature has room for error.63 
Repeating the Court’s now entrenched deference, he said, “The inclusion of a 
reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement[] will not put upon a law, 
otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity.”64 If diminution of value were meant to 
be a new test for land regulation, Euclid would have been a perfect case in 
which to apply it. Seventy-five percent is an enormous reduction in value. Yet 
the Court did not bite. 
As the sun set on the Lochner era, the Court continued upholding zoning 
laws and applying the same deferential standard of review. The Court affirmed 
Euclid in Zahn v. Board of Public Works65 and Gorieb v. Fox.66 In Zahn, the 
plaintiff wanted to operate a business along Wilshire Avenue in Los Angeles; 
 
 56. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 57. Id. at 379–80. 
 58. Id. at 380. 
 59. Id. at 384. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 397. 
 62. Id. at 387–88. 
 63. Id. at 388–89. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 274 U.S. 325 (1927). 
 66. 274 U.S. 603 (1927). Interestingly, Justice Sutherland, one of the notorious “four horsemen” of 
the Lochner era, authored the majority opinions in Euclid, Zahn, and Gorieb. If any one Justice had 
been the authoritative interpreter of the Lochner era’s impact on land regulation, it would have been 
Sutherland. 
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however, the area was zoned residential.67 Given the property’s location and 
high traffic volume, the plaintiff claimed that he could make more money 
operating a business, and that the ordinance violated due process.68 Rejecting 
the plaintiff’s argument, the Court explained, “The most that can be said is that 
whether that determination was an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise 
of power is fairly debatable.”69 
Likewise, in Gorieb, the Court evaluated a Roanoke zoning ordinance that 
had setback restrictions.70 The plaintiff claimed that the ordinance’s vagueness 
violated due process.71 Nonetheless, the Court again deferred to local judgment 
and upheld the ordinance.72 It followed the zoning precedent and reaffirmed its 
broad view of the police power.73 
In fact, during the Lochner era, the Court invalidated zoning ordinances in 
only two cases: Nectow v. City of Cambridge74 and Washington ex rel. Seattle 
Title Trust Co. v. Roberge.75 Both resembled Euclid in that they involved 
challenges to comprehensive zoning schemes. The zoning ordinance in Nectow 
divided Cambridge, Massachusetts, into residential, business, and unrestricted 
districts.76 The plaintiff owned a divided tract of property. Property to the north 
and west were zoned residential, while property to the south77 and east78 were 
unrestricted. The plaintiff’s property was zoned residential, and the ordinance 
further required the western edge of the property to be set back by 100 feet, 
leaving only sixty-five feet in depth.79 
Unlike the result in Euclid, however, a special master found that no use 
could be made of the property as a residential property, given that the 
surrounding property was zoned “industrial” and that the usable space was 
limited.80 Exacerbating the situation, there was an outstanding contract to sell 
the land, but the buyer refused to comply in light of these new restrictions.81 The 
Court held that the city had engaged in arbitrary line-drawing and that the 
regulation was therefore unconstitutional.82 The diminution of value served as 
 
 67. Zahn, 274 U.S. at 327. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 328. 
 70. Gorieb, 274 U.S. at 604. 
 71. Id. at 605–06. 
 72. Id. at 608. 
 73. Id. (“[Legislative] conclusions should not be disturbed by the courts unless clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable.”). 
 74. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
 75. 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
 76. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 185. 
 77. The Ford Motor Company had a large assembly plant on the southern property. Id. at 186. 
 78. This property belonged to the plaintiff. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 187. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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evidence that the ordinance did not advance the general welfare.83 The plat 
revealed no reason that the plaintiff’s property had to be zoned residential; the 
city could have drawn the line a mere 100 feet to the left.84 
In Roberge, a lack of procedural due process and an invalid delegation of 
power led a unanimous Court to invalidate a building regulation. Roberge 
involved a challenge to a Seattle ordinance requiring neighboring-landowner 
permission to build any “philanthropic home for children or for old people.”85 
The plaintiff owned and operated a home for the “aged poor” and wanted to 
tear it down to build a new, fireproof home.86 The city had denied the plaintiff a 
building permit because he had failed to gather the required consent of his 
neighbors.87 The Court held that this delegation of power to neighboring 
landowners violated due process.88 There was no mechanism for review, so 
neighbors could easily abuse the power.89 Such delegation, the Court said, was 
“repugnant” to due process.90 Comprehensive zoning was not the problem; the 
problem was the way in which such a plan circumvented due process in its 
application. Interestingly, rather than requiring a safety improvement (as most 
regulations do), the Roberge regulation actually prevented one. Contrary to the 
views of some scholars,91 Nectow and Roberge are unique exceptions to the 
Court’s otherwise overwhelming approval of zoning; they do not represent 
trends or principled attempts to limit zoning by wielding the tool of nuisance 
restraints. 
The last land-regulation case in the Lochner era was Miller v. Schoene.92 A 
Virginia law required landowners to cut down any cedar-rust-infected tree 
located within two miles of an apple orchard.93 Under the act, neighboring 
landowners could petition the state entomologist, who would conduct an 
investigation and ultimately decide whether trees should be destroyed.94 As it 
had in Welch, the Court made it a point to not limit the police power to 
prevention of harm alone: “We need not weigh with nicety the question 
whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; 
or whether they may be so declared by statute.”95 Unlike Roberge, the final 
decisionmaking authority rested with a state official, rather than with 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. In reference to the line-drawing, the Court said, “[S]uch restriction cannot be imposed if it does 
not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” Id. at 188. 
 85. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 118 (1928).  
 86. Id. at 117. 
 87. Id. at 119. 
 88. Id. at 122. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 5 (treating nuisance categories as a comprehensive constitutional 
boundary for Lochner-era zoning regulations). 
 92. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
 93. Id. at 277–78. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 280. 
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neighboring landowners. With appropriate procedures in place, the law was 
valid under the “clearly arbitrary” test.96 
The Lochner-era cases exhibit a deferential standard regarding review of 
land regulation. So long as land regulations were reasonable and not clearly 
arbitrary, and so long as proper procedural checks were available, the 
legislature could regulate land without compensating landowners. Nuisance and 
harm-prevention aided in defining, not limiting, the police power. Diminution 
of value and absence of reciprocity of advantage were only evidence of 
unreasonableness and arbitrariness, and were not, arguably, tests in themselves. 
Except for Roberge and Nectow, every one of the zoning cases affirmed lower-
court decisions. The grants of certiorari in these cases show the Court’s desire 
to strengthen the legitimacy of local land regulation by reaffirming precedent. 
The affirmations also show that lower courts understood the Court’s repeatedly 
articulated standard. 
II 
LAND REGULATION AFTER LOCHNER 
Few Supreme Court cases addressed land regulation in the period 
immediately following the Lochner era. Some suggest this dearth of land-
regulation cases is evidence of the Court’s lowered protection of property 
rights.97 But there is another explanation. In the wake of the Lochner era’s 
demise, land-regulation cases fell by the wayside in the Court’s effort to avoid 
questioning the police power.98 For the half century leading up to the New Deal, 
the Court had zealously protected economic rights by restricting the police 
power. With the rise of the administrative state and the rejection of Lochner, 
however, it was likely simpler for the Court to avoid reviewing the police power 
in general. Thus, Supreme Court review of land regulation was the baby that 
was thrown out with the bath water. 
Yet, in the cases in which the Court did address the validity of land 
regulations immediately following the enactment of the New Deal, the Court 
stayed focused on the government’s police-power exercise and continued using 
the “clearly arbitrary” standard. The Court’s standard remained constant 
through Carolene Products. 
A quarter century after Carolene Products, however, a misinterpreted 
resurrection of Mahon caused the Court’s approach to shift. The Court began 
glancing obliquely at land regulation, not through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, but through the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Yet 
this shift favored landowners. Rather than focus solely on the government 
 
 96. Id. at 280–81. 
 97. See James L. Oakes, “Property Rights” in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 
583, 608 (1981) (“[P]roperty rights were essentially confined to a legal dust bin.”). 
 98. Justice Black’s majority opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern 
Iron & Metal Co. observed that, at least since 1934, the Court had “steadily rejected the due process 
philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases.” 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949). 
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action, as the Fourteenth Amendment analysis did, the Court developed a 
Takings Clause jurisprudence that, in addition to analyzing the government’s 
action, examined the regulation’s effect on the landowner. 
The first post-Lochner-era case to examine a land regulation was Queenside 
Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl,99 in which the Court continued its traditional deference 
to legislatively determined exercises of the police power. The debate in Saxl was 
over the validity of a 1944 safety regulation, a traditional exercise of the police 
power.100 Factually and doctrinally, the case fits squarely within its Lochner-era 
precedent. New York required nonfireproof lodging houses to comply with new 
regulations, including a requirement for sprinkler systems.101 The plaintiff said 
his lodging house was not a fire risk, the property was worth $25,000, and the 
sprinkler system would cost $7,500.102 The regulation, he argued, was 
unreasonable.103 
The Court upheld the regulation under a traditional due-process analysis, 
focusing on the government’s action: “The question of validity turns on the 
power of the legislature to deal with the prescribed class.”104 Following the 
deference seen in Reinman and Hadacheck, the Court explained, “It is for the 
legislature to decide what regulations are needed to reduce fire hazards to the 
minimum.”105 
In 1962, the Court decided Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,106 another case 
in the factual and doctrinal line of Reinman and Hadacheck. The town of 
Hempstead, New York, passed a drainage and pit-excavation ordinance, 
restricting how deep a company could dig.107 When the town attempted to 
enforce the ordinance, a landowner and mining company challenged its 
constitutionality.108 As in Hadacheck, the town came to the harm,109 and as in 
Reinman, the ordinance effectively closed the plaintiff’s business.110 As it had in 
the Lochner era, the Court began by judging the ordinance through Fourteenth 
Amendment due process.111 The Court detoured slightly from its traditional 
approach, however, after identifying a legitimate purpose. 
Mindful of Mahon, Justice Clark opined that a regulation could be a 
taking.112 Channeling Holmes, he wrote, “There is no set formula to determine 
 
 99. 328 U.S. 80 (1946). 
 100. Id. at 81. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 82. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 83. 
 105. Id. 
 106. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
 107. Id. at 590–92. 
 108. Id. at 590–91. 
 109. Id. at 591. 
 110. Id. at 592. 
 111. Id. at 592–93. 
 112. Id. at 594. 
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where regulation ends and taking begins.”113 The Court did not proceed down 
this path because, it explained, there was no evidence the Hempstead 
excavation ordinance reduced the land’s value.114 Rather, the Court returned to 
its traditional Fourteenth Amendment analysis—“whether the prohibition . . . is 
a valid exercise of the town’s police power”115—and declared the regulation 
valid.116 But a seed was planted in precedent that Mahon might stand for 
something different than what the Court appears to have originally intended. 
The Court significantly changed its approach in 1978, when in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York,117 it shifted to a multifactor test. Penn 
Central involved the 1965 New York Landmarks Preservation Law,118 which 
restricted alterations to designated historic landmarks in New York City. 
Following the designation of Grand Central Terminal as a historic site, and 
without seeking judicial review of the designation, Penn Central entered into an 
agreement with a British company to build a structure above the terminal.119 
A mixture of Takings Clause analysis with traditional Due Process Clause 
analysis differentiates Penn Central from its predecessors.120 Formally inviting 
the Takings Clause to the dance changed the issue from, “Did the state have the 
power to enact this regulation?,” to, “What is this regulation’s effect?” This 
combined analysis required considering not only the government’s action, but 
also the impact on the landowner. From precedent,121 the Court derived factors 
relevant to determining whether a regulation is a taking: “The economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of 
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the government 
action.”122 Although the Court ultimately held for the city,123 doctrinally these 
factors weigh in favor of the property owner: two of the three factors focus on 
the regulation’s impact on the property owner. The property owner thus has a 
chance for compensation, regardless of the propriety of the government action. 
Finally, the Court formally applied the Penn Central factors in Agins v. City 
of Tiburon.124 The Agins plaintiff challenged use and density restrictions that 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 596–97. 
 117. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 118. N.Y. CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 205-1.0–207-21.0 (1976). 
 119. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116–19. 
 120. Id. at 122. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court notes this. But the operative constitutional mechanism is the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 121. Id. at 124–28. The Court looked at a number of cases from during and after the Lochner era. 
 122. Id. at 124. 
 123. Id. at 138. 
 124. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
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limited the number of homes he could build on his property.125 The property had 
great value as a development site, and the landowner claimed the ordinance was 
a taking that required compensation.126 Like the balance of factors in Penn 
Central, the Agins test presumptively weighs in favor of the property owner. 
The Court explained, “The application of a general zoning law to particular 
property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his 
land.”127 
Analogizing to Euclid, the Court held the ordinance substantially advanced 
state interests.128 However, the Agins Court continued beyond the point where 
the Lochner-era Court would have stopped—it recognized that a challenge to 
the regulation could be based on effects alone.129 Though the Court did not 
apply the full test, for ripeness reasons,130 a new standard fully emerged. Not 
only will the government’s action be judged for reasonableness, but the 
regulation’s impact will be judged in degree. This test gives property owners an 
avenue of attack that was unavailable in the Lochner era. 
Empirical evidence also reveals that the Court considers Lochner-era land-
regulation cases to be different from Lochner-era substantive due-process cases. 
The Court has completely rejected Lochner-era cases protecting substantive 
due process and economic freedoms. Since that time the Court has not cited 
Lochner v. New York,131 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,132 Hammer v. 
Dagenhart,133 or Weaver v. Palmer Bros.134 as binding precedent or to support a 
principle of law. Yet the Court regularly cites Lochner-era land-regulation cases 
for support in land-regulation cases. Between 1938 and 1980, the following cases 
were cited as precedent in land-regulation cases: Welch twice,135 Reinman three 
times,136 Hadacheck three times,137 Mahon three times,138 and Euclid nine times.139 
 
 125. Id. at 257–58. 
 126. Id. at 258. 
 127. Id. at 260. 
 128. Id. at 261. 
 129. Id. at 260 (“The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance . . . denies an owner economically viable use of his land.”). 
 130. Because the plaintiff had not submitted plans for development, the Court could not compare 
what he could and could not have done with his property. Thus, a diminution assessment could not be 
performed. Id. at 262–63. Interestingly, the plaintiff in Euclid committed this same strategic blunder by 
suing too quickly. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). 
 131. Last cited as support by a majority opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 132. Overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 133. Overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 134. Last cited as support by a majority opinion in 1934 in Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Illinois, 
292 U.S. 535 (1934), and there only for a procedural issue. Id. at 558. 
 135. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978); Bowles v. Willingham, 
321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944). 
 136. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 126; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962); 
Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946). 
 137. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 593; Saxl, 328 U.S. at 83; S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 
U.S. 177, 191 (1938). 
 138. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594; Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 
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The Court has also cited cases that struck down zoning laws: Nectow four 
times,140 and Roberge twice.141 These are particularly striking numbers given the 
relative paucity of land-regulation cases decided. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
A common misunderstanding of the Lochner era and a common, but 
mistaken, interpretation of Mahon have engendered belief that the New Deal 
ended an era of heightened scrutiny of land regulation. An examination of 
Lochner-era land-regulation cases, however, shows that the Lochner Court did 
not apply heightened scrutiny toward land regulation. Instead, it only 
invalidated regulations that were obviously unreasonable or arbitrary142 or those 
that deprived property owners of procedural due process.143 Far from favoring 
landowner plaintiffs, this test virtually ensured success for government 
defendants. 
If the New Deal affected the Court’s approach to land-regulation cases, the 
cases following the Lochner era should reflect such a change. But no significant 
doctrinal change emerged in the wake of Carolene Products. The Court 
continued applying the “clearly arbitrary” standard under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, eventually introducing a multifactor analysis grounded in the 
Takings Clause that tipped the scale in the property owner’s favor. Property-
rights advocates may lament the level of scrutiny applied to land regulation, but 
any fault with the level of scrutiny should not be ascribed to the legacy of 
Carolene Products and the New Deal. 
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